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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jose Ibarra appeals from his Judgment and Commitment stemming from a jury 
verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery. Mr. Ibarra asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present expert testimony on the 
subject of domestic violence, as that testimony would not assist the jury and any limited 
relevance was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Mr. Ibarra 
further asserts that the State will be unable to prove the error in admitting this testimony 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State charged Jose Ibarra by Information with one count of felony domestic 
battery (by causing traumatic injury), and one count of misdemeanor domestic battery 
(no traumatic injury). 1 (R., pp.25-26.) 
Prior to trial, the State filed a document disclosing their intention to call an expert 
witness to testify about "Domestic violence, the dynamics of domestic violence, the 
effects of domestic violence, common characteristics of domestic violence, why victims 
often recant, dynamics of and causes for recanting, and other common characteristics 
relevant to these facts." (R., pp.61-62.) Mr. Ibarra filed a written objection to the State's 
proposed expert testimony arguing such testimony is intended to assist the jury in 
determining the alleged victim's credibility, and that "[t]here is no scientific, technical or 
specialized knowledge needed in order to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses in this 
1 The jury acquitted Mr. Ibarra of the misdemeanor domestic battery charge. 
(R., p.141.) 
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case. Issues of anger and why people might fabricate allegations are common to the 
human existence," and the testimony would not assist the jury. (R., pp.64-65.) 
Mr. Ibarra continued by arguing that the testimony is not relevant as the proposed 
expert has no knowledge of the lbarras' relationship "or whether there exists a domestic 
violence relationship between the two." (R., p.65.) Furthermore, Mr. Ibarra argued that 
any probative value in the testimony is outweighed by its prejudicial impact and that its 
only purpose would be to "cast a shadow on the alleged victim's credibility as a witness 
and infer that the Defendant is an abuser." (R., p.65.) Defense counsel further 
asserted Mr. Ibarra would be prejudiced by the evidence as "there is a high likelihood 
that the jury will infer from the expert testimony" that the lbarras are in a "domestic 
violence relationship." (R., p.65.) 
During a pre-trial hearing on the proposed testimony, the State argued that "most 
jurors" don't have "common knowledge" about domestic violence and "the reasons why 
some victims may minimize or recant" and "don't often understand the cycle of violence 
... ". (Tr. 3/14/13, p.7, L.9 - p.9, L.13.) On the contrary, defense counsel argued, "I do 
believe that the nature of humans, that people change their stories, may recant or 
change, that is exactly what human nature is, and that is not outside the realm of what 
an ordinary juror would comprehend or understand." (Tr. 3/14/13, p.9, Ls.15-25.) 
Defense counsel further argued that there would be undue prejudice with such 
testimony as it would put into the minds of the jurors "that this is a domestic violence 
situation without any testimony regarding - without even knowing anything about the 
situation." (Tr. 3/14/13, p.10, Ls.1-18.) 
The district court found that, provided the appropriate foundation was laid, 
"expert testimony in this area ... is probably admissible" as such testimony would be 
2 
helpful to the jury. (Tr. 3/14/13, p.10, L.19 - p.11, L.11.) Although the court did not 
specifically articulate that it believed the probative value of the testimony is not 
outweighed by its prejudicial impact, the court stated, "[o]f course that opinion would be 
subject to vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and clear 
instruction on the burden of proof and everything" and that the jury could put whatever 
weight on the testimony it deemed appropriate. (Tr. 3/14/13, p.11, Ls.11-20.) 
At trial, Amber Ibarra testified that she and Jose Ibarra have been married since 
2009, and have two children in common, but that they had been separated since the fall 
of 2012. (Tr. Trial, p.173, L.1 - p.174, L.19.) On Halloween night, she had plans to 
meet with Mr. Ibarra at her house around 6:30 or 7:00 to take the kids trick-or-treating 
but she was running late. (Tr. Trial, p.174, L.20 - p.175, L.21.) An angry Mr. Ibarra 
called her from a pay phone and told her that his car was broken down at the Nampa 
Wince and that she should meet him there, which she did. (Tr., Trial, p.175, L.22 -
p.176, L.22.) When she arrived, Mr. Ibarra walked to her minivan and got in with her 
and three of her children. (Tr. Trial, p.177, Ls.1-20.) The two got into a verbal 
argument and the children asked them to stop fighting. (Tr. Trial, p.177, L.21 - p.178, 
L.17.) The lbarras then got out of the car, Mr. Ibarra said that he wanted to "check" to 
see if Ms. Ibarra had been cheating, Ms. Ibarra said "go ahead," and Mr. Ibarra stuck his 
hand down her pants.2 (Tr., p.179, L.13- p.181, L.5.) 
Ms. Ibarra testified that she gave her cell phone to Mr. Ibarra, who made a phone 
call then put the phone in his pocket. (Tr. Trial, p.181, Ls.6-20.) Ms. Ibarra started 
2 This event was the subject of the misdemeanor domestic battery charge alleged in 
Count 11, of which Mr. Ibarra was acquitted. (R., pp.26, 141.) 
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crying and asking for her phone back, but Mr. Ibarra refused to return it. (Tr. Trial, 
p.181, 1 p.182, L.3.) Ms. Ibarra described what happened next as follows: 
He got in his car. And so I stuck my arm in the window trying to 
open the door, which it was locked and I couldn't get it opened. So I 
started grabbing his shirt, and he wouldn't give me my phone, and I did 
start scratching him and hitting him. And then he rolled the window up 
and drove off. 
(Tr. Trial, p.182, Ls.15-23.) When he drove off, Ms. Ibarra ran alongside the car trying to 
get her arm out, she was able to do so, but her arm was bruised. (Tr. Trial, p.183, L.20 -
p.184, L.9.) The next day, Ms. Ibarra went to the Family Justice Center in Nampa and 
eventually spoke with Officer Woodbury of the Nampa Police Department, and she told 
him generally what had happened; however, Ms. Ibarra did not tell him that she had 
scratched and hit Mr. Ibarra because she did not want to get herself into trouble, and she 
was not asked if she had done anything to harm Mr. Ibarra. (Tr. Trial, p.184, L.10 -
p.192, L.21.) Ms. Ibarra also filled out a civil protection order and she admitted she did 
not reveal that she had scratched Mr. Ibarra in that document either. (Tr. Trial, p.194, 
L.10-p.197, L.12.) 
The State played audio recordings of phone conversations between Jose and 
Amber Ibarra in which Mr. Ibarra is heard asking Ms. Ibarra not to testify and to go and 
speak with Mr. lbarra's attorney. (Tr. Trial, p.215, Ls.12-24, p.218, L.22 - p.219, L.20; 
Ex.6.) On cross-examination, Ms. Ibarra testified that she felt the prosecutor, not 
Mr. Ibarra, had been manipulating the process and that defense counsel was the first 
person to ask her whether or not she struck Mr. Ibarra. (Tr. Trial, p.220, Ls.1-18.) 
Ms. Ibarra further testified that after she freed her arm, she got in her car and followed 
Mr. Ibarra. (Tr. Trial, p.223, L.19 - p.224, L.5.) She testified that she did not believe that 
Mr. Ibarra battered her and that she believed he did not intentionally try and hurt her. 
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(Tr. Trial, p.224, Ls.11-18.) Ms. lbarra testified that she feels safe around Mr. Ibarra and 
that she believes he was just trying to get out of the situation and did not try to hurt her. 
(Tr. Trial, p.226, L.19 p.230, L.16.) 
The State's next witness was Dr. Lisa Bostaph, their purported expert on domestic 
violence, and Mr. Ibarra again objected to her testimony. (Tr. Trial, p.231, L.12 - p.233, 
L.7.) Dr. Bostaph testified that common characteristics of domestic violence include 
physical violence, sexual violence and "psychological violence." (Tr. Trial, p.238, Ls.4-
19.) She then described the "Circle of Violence or the Power and Control Wheel" 
between the "batterer" and the victim, and 
... what holds the whole wheel together is this threat of physical violence, 
this threat that I'm going to hurt you, I'm going to hit you, I'm going to slap 
you, I'm going to beat you, or sexual violence. That's what holds this all 
together. If that threat of violence works, I don't have to use these. I don't 
have to hit you. If all these other tactics work, I never have to hit you. The 
threat of hitting you will be enough to control your behavior. 
If those tactics don't work, then I have to - then I use violence, and 
they you understand that if I've hit you once because you didn't do what I 
said, then you know the next time when I tell you to do something, you'll 
do it, because you know that if you don't, I'll follow it up with hitting, 
because I've done it once, so why wouldn't I do it again. 
(Tr. Trial, p.238, L.20 - p.240, L.21.) Dr. Bostaph then testified that victims of domestic 
violence are "generally fearful" of the batterer and make decisions based upon whether 
or not they are going to be beaten. (Tr. Trial, p.240, L.22 - p.241, L.24.) She testified 
that victims who report abuse get scared and decide that they need to "make it all go 
away" by recanting or saying they were at fault. (Tr. Trial, p.241, L.25 - p.243, L.9.) 
Dr. Bostaph testified that when victims leave such a relationship they are 7 to 15 times 
more likely to be murdered in the first few months. (Tr. Trial, p.243, L.10 - p.245, L.3.) 
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After the State rested3, Mr. Ibarra called as a witness his mother, Maria Ibarra, 
who testified that she saw "scratches with nails" on his face on November 1st of 2012. 
(Tr. Trial, p.252, L.19 p.254, L.6.) Amber Ibarra was also called by the defense and 
testified that she did not feel intimidated during the phone calls that were recorded and 
played for the jury. (Tr. Trial, p.265, L.20 p.266, L.12.) She further testified that she 
has never experienced domestic violence while she has been with Mr. Ibarra, although 
she did claim Mr. Ibarra had previously attempted to strangle her when she filled out an 
application for a protection order.4 (Tr. Trial, p.267, L.6 - p.268, L.13, p.270, L.12 -
p.271, L.1.) 
The jury found Mr. Ibarra guilty of felony domestic battery. (R., p.140.) The 
district court sentenced him to a unified term of ten years, with seven and one-half years 
fixed, and Mr. Ibarra filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.159-165.) 
3 The State's first two witnesses were Officer Woodbury, who testified that he took the 
report from Ms. Ibarra and obtained a surveillance video of the incident from Wince, and 
Andrew Malloy, the Wince loss prevention person who provided the video to Officer 
Woodbury. (Tr. Trial, p.150, L.1 - p.169, L.24.) The State also played the surveillance 
video (Ex. 5) for the jury. (Tr. Trial, p.164, L.4 - p.169, L.24.) The video shows 
Ms. Ibarra running alongside of the car as Mr. Ibarra is driving away, but it is not clear 
whether her arm was stuck in the window as the camera was oriented towards the 
passenger side of the car as it started to move. (See Ex. 5.) 
4 The jury was instructed that all testimony related to the protection order could only be 
considered as it weighed on Amber lbarra's testimony, and could not be considered as 
evidence of guilt. (R., pp.138-139.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to present expert 
testimony on the subject of domestic violence? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Present Expert 
Testimony On The Subject Of Domestic Violence 
A Introduction 
Mr. Ibarra asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the 
State to present Dr. Bostaph's testimony on the subject of domestic violence, as her 
testimony was not helpful to the jury. Alternatively, Mr. Ibarra asserts that any limited 
relevance of Dr. Bostaph's testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
B. Applicable Jurisprudence 
Idaho appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 
lower court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 
584, 591 (2013) (quoting White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004).) '"A trial court 
does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2) acts 
within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and 
(3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason."' Id. (quoting Fazzio v. Mason, 
150 Idaho 591, 594 (2011 ).) 
'"Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. Relevant 
evidence is admissible unless otherwise prohibited by the Rules of Evidence, while 
evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. I.R.E. 402. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 
governs that admissibility of expert testimony and states, 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
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I.R. 702 (emphasis added). "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." I.R.E. 403. 
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that is freely reviewed. State v. 
Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008). When reviewing the determination that the 
probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of 
discretion standard is applied. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993). 
C. Dr. Bostaph's Testimony Regarding The Dynamics Of Domestic Violence Would 
Not Assist The Trier Of Fact In Understanding The Evidence Or In Determining A 
Fact In Issue 
Amber Ibarra testified that she reached into the window of Mr. lbarra's car, tried 
to unlock the door, and scratched at Mr. lbarra's face, and that Mr. Ibarra rolled up the 
window and started to drive away, and she ran run alongside the car while pulling out 
her arm, which caused bruises. (Tr. Trial, p.182, Ls.15-23.) She acknowledged that 
she told Officer Woodbury most of this information, but that she left out the part about 
her scratching at Mr. lbarra's face due to her not wanting to face charges herself. 
(Tr. Trial, p.184, L.10 - p.192, L.21.) While the recorded phone calls between the 
lbarras showed that Mr. Ibarra encouraged Ms. Ibarra not to testify, there were no 
threats of violence associated with those calls. (Ex. 6.) Mr. Ibarra was charged with 
committing two crimes during one dispute - he was not charged with committing 
multiple acts of violence against Ms. Ibarra during multiple incidents. In short, the jury 
was not presented with evidence that the lbarras were involved in any type of on-going, 
violence infused relationship. Therefore, Dr. Bostaph's testimony about "[d]omestic 
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violence, the dynamics of domestic violence, the effects of domestic violence, common 
characteristics of domestic violence, why victims often recant, dynamics of and causes 
for recanting, and other common characteristics relevant to these facts" (R., pp.61-62), 
was not helpful to jurors, who would be more than capable of determining whether 
Mr. Ibarra was guilty based upon Ms. lbarra's testimony and impeachment thereof, and 
the other evidence presented. Therefore, Dr. Bosthaph's testimony was not admissible 
pursuant to I.RE. 702, and the district court abused its discretion by allowing her 
testimony. 
D. Alternatively, Any Probative Value In Dr. Bostaph's Testimony Was Substantial 
Outweighed By Its Prejudicial Effect 
Even if this Court were to determine that Dr. Bostaph's testimony was helpful to 
the jury in some way and, therefore, relevant, the limited relevance was substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
1. Dr. Bostaph's Testimony Allowed The Jury To Presume That The lbarras 
Were Involved In An On-Going Violent Relationship 
The jurors were asked to decide whether Jose Ibarra was guilty of two acts of 
domestic battery that both allegedly occurred on the same day. The jury heard 
Dr. Bostaph testify about such issues as the "Circle of Violence" describing on-going 
patterns of abuse. (Tr. Trial, p.238, L.20 - p.240, L.21.) In light of Dr. Bostaph's 
testimony, there is a substantial danger of unfair prejudice to Mr. Ibarra, i.e., the jury 
would assume that the reason they were hearing about the "Circle of Violence" is that 
the lbarras' relationship fell into such a category. There is a substantial danger that the 
jury would believe that Jose Ibarra held "the wheel" of their relationship together with 
threats and use of violence. The limited relevance that such testimony would have on 
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issues the jury was actually asked to decide, was substantially outweighed by the 
that the jury would consider Dr. Bostaph's testimony as describing the lbarras' 
actual relationship, and that they would render a verdict based, not upon the evidence 
actually presented, but upon the presumption that Mr. Ibarra is a "batterer" and he must 
be guilty. As such, the district court abused its discretion by permitting Dr. Bostaph's 
testimony. 
2. Dr. Bostaph's Testimony Allowed The Jury To Presume That Mr. Ibarra 
Posed An On-Going Threat To Ms. lbarra's Life 
In addition to presuming that Mr. Ibarra had physically harmed Ms. Ibarra in the 
past, Dr. Bostaph's testimony allowed the jury to presume that Mr. Ibarra would commit 
violent acts against Ms. Ibarra in the future. Dr. Bostaph testified that when threats of 
violence do not work, and the victim defies the batterer, the batterer uses violence, up to 
and including murder, against the victim. (Tr. Trial, p.238, L.20 - p.245, L.20.) There is 
a substantial danger that the jurors, hearing this evidence, would presume that 
Mr. Ibarra would inflict such violence upon Ms. Ibarra because she defied him by 
testifying consistently with what she had initially told Officer Woodbury, i.e., that 
Mr. Ibarra rolled up the window and started driving away with her arm still in the window. 
The limited relevance of Dr. Bostaph's testimony was substantially outweighed by the 
danger that the jury would convict Mr. Ibarra for fear that, if they acquitted him and he 
was not punished by the legal system, he would harm or even kill Ms. Ibarra for having 
defied him in the first place. As such, the district court abused its discretion by 
permitting Dr. Bostaph's testimony. 
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The State Will Not Be Able To Prove The Error In Allowing Dr. Bostaph's 
Testimony ls Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
"To hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence 
complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Where alleged error is followed 
by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the 
State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). In describing the Chapman test, the United 
States Supreme Court has held, 
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without 
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether 
the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to 
the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that 
was never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to 
support that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee. 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993) (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
578 (1986); Clark, 478 U.S at 593 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); Pope v. Illinois, 481 
U.S. 497, 509-510 (1987) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).) 
As noted in section D of this brief, and incorporated herein by reference, 
Dr. Bostaph's testimony was highly prejudicial and would lead a jury to conclude that 
Mr. Ibarra is the type of "batterer" that she described by the mere fact that such 
testimony was presented to the jury. The State will simply be unable to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Dr. Bostaph's testimony did not contribute to the verdict. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ibarra respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand 
his case to the district court. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2014. 
JAsqN)i PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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